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Abstract. This paper is devoted to Nash equilibrium for games in capacities.
Such games with payoff expressed by Choquet integral were considered in [8]
and existence of Nash equilibrium was proved. We also consider games in
capacities but with expected payoff expressed by Sugeno integral. We prove
existence of Nash equilibrium using categorical methods and abstract convexity
theory.
1. Introduction
The classical Nash equilibrium theory is based on fixed point theory and was
developed in frames of linear convexity. The mixed strategies of a player are prob-
ability (additive) measures on a set of pure strategies. But an interest to Nash
equilibria in more general frames is rapidly growing in last decades. There are
also results about Nash equilibrium for non-linear convexities. For instance, Briec
and Horvath proved in [1] existence of Nash equilibrium point for B-convexity and
MaxPlus convexity. Let us remark that MaxPlus convexity is related to idempotent
(Maslov) measures in the same sense as linear convexity is related to probability
measures.
We can use additive measures only when we know precisely probabilities of all
events considered in a game. However it is not the case in many modern eco-
nomic models. The decision theory under uncertainty considers a model when
probabilities of states are either not known or imprecisely specified. Gilboa [7] and
Schmeidler [18] axiomatized expectations expressed by Choquet integrals attached
to non-additive measures called capacities, as a formal approach to decision-making
under uncertainty. Dow and Werlang [3] generalized this approach for two players
game where belief of each player about a choice of the strategy by the other player
is a capacity. This result was extended onto games with arbitrary finite number of
players [6].
Kozhan and Zaricznyi introduced in [8] a formal mathematical generalization
of Dow and Werlang’s concept of Nash equilibrium of a game where players are
allowed to form non-additive beliefs about opponent’s decision but also to play their
mixed non-additive strategies. Such game is called by authors game in capacities.
The expected payoff function was there defined using a Choquet integral. Kozhan
and Zaricznyi proved existence theorem using a linear convexity on the space of
capacities which is preserved by Choquet integral. There was stated a problem of
existence of Nash equilibrium for another functors [8].
An alternative to so-called Choquet expected utility model is the qualitative
decision theory. The corresponding expected utility is expressed by Sugeno integral.
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See for example papers [4], [5], [2], [17] and others. Sugeno integral chooses a
median value of utilities which is qualitative counterpart of the averaging operation
by Choquet integral.
Following [8] we introduce in this paper the general mathematical concept of
Nash equilibrium of a game in capacities. However, motivated by the qualitative
approach, we consider expected payoff function defined by Sugeno integral. To
prove existence theorem for this concrete case, we consider more general frame-
work which could unify all mentioned before situations and give us a method to
prove theorems about existence of Nash equilibrium in different contexts. We use
categorical methods and abstract convexity theory.
The notion of convexity considered in this paper is considerably broader then
the classic one; specifically, it is not restricted to the context of linear spaces. Such
convexities appeared in the process of studying different structures like partially
ordered sets, semilattices, lattices, superextensions etc. We base our approach on
the notion of topological convexity from [21] where the general convexity theory is
covered from axioms to application in different areas. Particularly, there is proved
Kakutani fixed point theorem for abstract convexity.
Above mentioned constructions of the spaces of probability measures, idempotent
measures and capacities are functorial and could be completed to monads (see [16],
[23] and [12] for more details). There was introduced in [13] a convexity structure
on each F-algebra for any monad F in the category of compact Hausdorff spaces
and continuous maps. Particularly, topological properties of monads with binary
convexities were investigated.
We prove a counterpart of Nash theorem for an abstract convexity in this paper.
Particularly, we consider binary convexities. These results we use to obtain Nash
theorem for algebras of any L- monad with binary convexity. Since capacity monad
is an L-monad with binary convexity [14], we obtain as corollary the corresponding
result for capacities.
2. Games in capacities
By Comp we denote the category of compact Hausdorff spaces (compacta) and
continuous maps. For each compactum X we denote by C(X) the Banach space of
all continuous functions on X with the usual sup-norm. In what follows, all spaces
and maps are assumed to be in Comp except for R and maps in sets C(X) with X
compact Hausdorff.
We need the definition of capacity on a compactum X . We follow a terminol-
ogy of [12]. A function c which assign each closed subset A of X a real number
c(A) ∈ [0, 1] is called an upper-semicontinuous capacity on X if the three following
properties hold for each closed subsets F and G of X :
1. c(X) = 1, c(∅) = 0,
2. if F ⊂ G, then c(F ) ≤ c(G),
3. if c(F ) < a, then there exists an open set O ⊃ F such that c(B) < a for each
compactum B ⊂ O.
We extend a capacity c to all open subsets U ⊂ X by the formula c(U) =
sup{c(K) | K is a closed subset of X such that K ⊂ U}.
It was proved in [12] that the space MX of all upper-semicontinuous capacities
on a compactum X is a compactum as well, if a topology on MX is defined by
a subbase that consists of all sets of the form O−(F, a) = {c ∈ MX | c(F ) < a},
where F is a closed subset of X , a ∈ [0, 1], and O+(U, a) = {c ∈ MX | c(U) > a},
where U is an open subset of X , a ∈ [0, 1]. Since all capacities we consider here are
upper-semicontinuous, in the following we call elements of MX simply capacities.
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There is considered in [8] a tensor product for capacities, which is a continuous
map ⊗ : MX1 × · · · ×MXn → M(X1 × · · · × Xn). Note that, despite the space
of capacities contains the space of probability measures, the tensor product of
capacities does not extend tensor product of probability measures.
Due to Zhou [24] we can identify the setMX with some set of functionals defined
on the space C(X) using the Choquet integral. We consider for each µ ∈ MX its
value on a function f ∈ C(X) defined by the formulae
µ(f) =
∫
fdµ =
∫
∞
0
µ{x ∈ X |f(X) ≥ t}dt+
∫ 0
−∞
(µ{x ∈ X |f(X) ≥ t} − 1)dt
Let us remember the definition of Nash equilibrium. We consider a n-players
game f : X =
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n with compact Hausdorff spaces of strategies Xi. The
coordinate function fi : X → R we call payoff function of i-th player. For x ∈ X
and ti ∈ Xi we use the notation (x; ti) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, ti, xi+1, . . . , xn). A point
x ∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium point if for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for each
ti ∈ Xi we have fi(x; ti) ≤ fi(x). Kozhan and Zarichnyj proved in [8] existence of
Nash equilibrium for game in capacities ef :
∏n
i=1MXi → R
n with expected payoff
functions defined by
efi(µ1, . . . , µn) =
∫
X1×···×Xn
fid(µ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ µn)
Let us remark that the Choquet functional representation of capacities preserves
the natural linear convexity structure on MX which was used in the proof of ex-
istence of Nash equilibrium [8]. However this representation does not preserve the
capacity monad structure. (We will introduce the monad notion in Section 4).
There was introduced [14] another functional representation of capacities using
Sugeno integral (see also [11] for similar result). This representation preserves the
capacity monad structure. Let us describe such representation. Fix any increasing
homeomorphism ψ : (0, 1)→ R. We put additionally ψ(0) = −∞, ψ(1) = +∞ and
assume −∞ < t < +∞ for each t ∈ R. We consider for each µ ∈ MX its value on
a function f ∈ C(X) defined by the formulae
µ(f) =
∫ Sug
X
fdµ = max{t ∈ R | µ(f−1([t,+∞))) ≥ ψ−1(t)}
Let us remark that we use some modification of Sugeno integral. The original
Sugeno integral [19] ”ignores” function values outside the interval [0, 1] and we
introduce a ”correction” homeomorphism ψ to avoid this problem. Now, following
[8], we consider a game in capacities sf :
∏n
i=1MXi → R
n, but motivated by [4],
we consider Sugeno expected payoff functions defined by
sfi(µ1, . . . , µn) =
∫ Sug
X1×···×Xn
fid(µ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ µn)
The main goal of this paper is to prove existence of Nash equilibrium for such
game. Since Sugeno integral does not preserve linear convexity on MX we can
not use methods from [8]. We will use some another natural convexity structure
which has the binarity property (has Helly number 2). We will obtain some general
result for such convexities which could be useful to investigate existence of Nash
equilibrium for diverse construction. Finally, we will obtain the result for capacities
as a corollary of these general results.
3. Binary convexities
A family C of closed subsets of a compactum X is called a convexity on X if
C is stable for intersection and contains X and the empty set. Elements of C are
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called C-convex (or simply convex). Although we follow general concept of abstract
convexity from [21], our definition is different. We consider only closed convex sets.
Such structure is called closure structure in [21]. The whole family of convex sets in
the sense of [21] could be obtained by the operation of union of up-directed families.
In what follows, we assume that each convexity contains all singletons.
A convexity C on X is called T2 if for each distinct x1, x2 ∈ X there exist S1,
S2 ∈ C such that S1 ∪ S2 = X , x1 /∈ S2 and x2 /∈ S1. Let us remark that if
a convexity C on a compactum X is T2, then C is a subbase for closed sets. A
convexity C on X is called T4 (normal) if for each disjoint C1, C2 ∈ C there exist
S1, S2 ∈ C such that S1 ∪ S2 = X , C1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and C2 ∩ S1 = ∅.
Let (X, C), (Y,D) be two compacta with convexity structures. A continuous map
f : X → Y is called CP-map (convexity preserving map) if f−1(D) ∈ C for each
D ∈ D; f is called CC-map (convex-to-convex map) if f(C) ∈ D for each C ∈ C.
By a multimap (set-valued map) of a set X into a set Y we mean a map F :
X → 2Y . We use the notation F : X ⊸ Y . If X and Y are topological spaces,
then a multimap F : X ⊸ Y is called upper semi-continuous (USC) provided for
each open set O ⊂ Y the set {x ∈ X | F (x) ⊂ O} is open in X . It is well-known
that a multimap is USC iff its graph is closed in X × Y .
Let F : X ⊸ X be a multimap. We say that a point x ∈ X is a fixed point of F
if x ∈ F (x). The following counterpart of Kakutani theorem for abstract convexity
is a partial case of Theorem 3 from [22] (it also could be obtain combining Theorem
6.15, Ch.IV and Theorem 4.10, Ch.III from [21]).
Theorem 1. Let C be a normal convexity on a compactum X such that all convex
sets are connected and F : X ⊸ X is a USC multimap with values in C. Then F
has a fixed point.
Let C be a family of subsets of a compactum X . We say that C is linked if the
intersection of every two elements is non-empty. A convexity C is called binary if
the intersection of every linked subsystem of C is non-empty.
Lemma 1. Let C be a T2 binary convexity on a continuum X. Then C is normal
and all convex sets are connected.
Proof. The first assertion of the lemma is proved in Lemma 3.1 [16]. Let us prove
the second one. Consider any A ∈ C. There was defined in [10] a retraction
hA : X → A by the formula hA(x) = ∩{C ∈ C | x ∈ C and C ∩A 6= ∅}. Hence A is
connected and the lemma is proved. 
Now we can reformulate Theorem 1 for binary convexities.
Theorem 2. Let C be a T2 binary convexity on a continuum X and F : X ⊸ X
is a USC multimap with values in C. Then F has a fixed point.
Now, let Ci be a convexity on Xi. We say that the function fi : X → R is quasi
concave by i-th coordinate if we have (fxi )
−1([t; +∞)) ∈ Ci for each t ∈ R and
x ∈ X where fxi : Xi → R is a function defined as follows f
x
i (ti) = fi(x; ti) for
ti ∈ Xi.
Theorem 3. Let f : X =
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n be a game with a normal convexity Ci
defined on each compactum Xi such that all convex sets are connected, the function
f is continuous and the function fi : X → R is quasi concave by i-th coordinate for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium point.
Proof. Fix any x ∈ X . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} consider a set Mxi ⊂ Xi defined
as follows Mxi = {t ∈ Xi | f
x
i (t) = maxs∈Xi f
x
i (s)}. We have that M
x
i is a closed
subset Xi. Since the function fi : X → R is quasi concave by i-th coordinate,
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we have that Mxi ∈ Ci. Define a multimap F : X ⊸ X by the formulae F (x) =∏n
i=1M
x
i for x ∈ X .
Let us show that F is USC. Consider any point (x, y) ∈ X×X such that y /∈ F (x).
Then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that fxi (yi) < maxs∈Xi f
x
i (s)}. Hence we can
choose ti ∈ Xi such that fi(x; yi) < fi(x; ti). Since fi is continuous, there exists a
neighborhood Ox of x in X and a neighborhood Oyi of yi in Yi such that for each
x′ ∈ Ox and y′i ∈ Oyi we have fi(x; y
′
i) < fi(x; ti). Put Oy = (pri)
−1(Oyi). Then
for each (x′, y′) ∈ Ox × Oy we have y′ /∈ F (x′). Thus the graph of F is closed in
X × Y , hence F is upper semicontinuous.
We consider on X the family C = {
∏n
i=1 Ci | Ci ∈ Ci}. It is easy to see that C
forms a normal convexity on compactum X such that all convex sets are connected.
Then by Theorem 1 F has a fixed point which is a Nash equilibrium point. 
Now, the following corollary follows from the previous theorem and Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. Let f : X =
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n be a game such that there is defined a
T2 binary convexity Ci on each continuum Xi, the function f is continuous and the
function fi : X → R is quasi concave by i-th coordinate for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium point.
4. L-monads and its algebras
We apply Corollary 1 to study games defined on algebras of binary L-monads.
We recall some categorical notions (see [9] and [20] for more details). We define
them only for the category Comp. Let F : Comp→ Comp be a covariant functor. A
functor F is called continuous if it preserves the limits of inverse systems. In what
follows, all functors assumed to preserve monomorphisms, epimorphisms, weight of
infinite compacta. We also assume that our functors are continuous. For a functor
F which preserves monomorphisms and an embedding i : A→ X we shall identify
the space FA and the subspace F (i)(FA) ⊂ FX .
A monad T = (T, η, µ) in the category Comp consists of an endofunctor T :
Comp → Comp and natural transformations η : IdComp → T (unity), µ : T 2 → T
(multiplication) satisfying the relations µ ◦ Tη = µ ◦ ηT =1T and µ ◦ µT = µ ◦ Tµ.
(By IdComp we denote the identity functor on the category Comp and T
2 is the
superposition T ◦ T of T .)
Let T = (T, η, µ) be a monad in the category Comp. The pair (X, ξ) where
ξ : TX → X is a map is called a T-algebra if ξ ◦ ηX = idX and ξ ◦ µX = ξ ◦ Tξ.
Let (X, ξ), (Y, ξ′) be two T-algebras. A map f : X → Y is called a T-algebras
morphism if ξ′ ◦ Tf = f ◦ ξ.
Let (X, ξ) be an F-algebra for a monad F = (F, η, µ) and A is a closed subset of
X . Denote by fA the quotient map fA : X → X/A (the classes of equivalence are
one-point sets {x} for x ∈ X \A and the set A) and put a = fA(A). Denote A+ =
(FfA)
−1(η(X/A)(a)). Define the F-convex hull CF(A) of A as follows CF(A) =
ξ(A+). Put additionally CF(∅) = ∅. We define the family CF(X, ξ) = {A ⊂ X |A
is closed and CF(A) = A}. Elements of the family CF(X, ξ) we call F-convex. It
was shown in [13] that the family CF(X, ξ) forms a convexity on X , moreover, each
morphism of F-algebras is a CP -map. Let us remark that one-point sets are always
F-convex.
We don’t know if the convexities we have introduced are T2. We consider
in this section a class of monads generating convexities which have this prop-
erty. The class of L-monads was introduced in [13] and it contains many well-
known monads in Comp like superextension, hyperspace, probability measure, ca-
pacity, idempotent measure etc. For φ ∈ C(X) by maxφ (min φ) we denote
maxx∈X φ(x) (minx∈X φ(x)) and piφ or pi(φ) denote the corresponding projection
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piφ :
∏
ψ∈C(X)[minψ,maxψ]→ [minφ,maxφ]. It was shown in [15] that for each L-
monad F = (F, η, µ) we can consider FX as subset of the product
∏
φ∈C(X)[min φ,maxφ],
moreover, we have piφ ◦ ηX = φ, piφ ◦ µX = pi(piφ) for all φ ∈ C(X) and piψ ◦ Ff =
piψ◦f for all ψ ∈ C(Y ), f : X → Y . We could consider these properties of L-monads
as a definition [15].
We say that an L-monad F = (F, η, µ) weakly preserves preimages if for each
map f : X → Y and each closed subset A ⊂ Y we have piφ(ν) ∈ [minφ(f−1(A)),
maxφ(f−1(A))] for each ν ∈ (Ff)−1(A) and φ ∈ C(X) [13]. It was shown in
[13] that for each L-monad F which weakly preserves preimages the convexity
CF(FX, µX) is T2.
Lemma 2. Let (X, ξ) be an F-algebra for an L-monad F = (F, η, µ) which weakly
preserves preimages. Then the map ξ : FX → X is a CC-map for convexities
CF(FX, µ) and CF(X, ξ) respectively.
Proof. Consider any B ∈ CF(FX, µ). We should show that ξ(B) ∈ CF(X, ξ). Denote
by χ : X → X/ξ(B) the quotient map and put b = χ(ξ(B)). Consider any A ∈ FX
such that Fχ(A) = (η(X/ξ(B))(b)). We should show that ξ(A) ∈ ξ(B).
Consider the quotient map χ1 : FX → FX/B and put b1 = χ1(B). There
exists a (unique) continuous map ξ′ : FX/B → X/ξ(B) such that ξ′(b1) = b and
ξ′ ◦ χ1 = χ ◦ ξ. Put D = F (ηX)(A). We have Fξ(D) = A, hence Fξ′ ◦ Fχ1(D) =
Fχ ◦ Fξ(D) = Fχ(A) = η(X/ξ(B))(b). Since F weakly preserves preimages, we
have Fχ1(D) = η(FX/B)(b1). Since B ∈ CF(FX, µ), we have µX(D) ∈ B. Hence
ξ(A) = ξ ◦ Fξ(D) = ξ ◦ µ(D) ∈ ξ(B). The lemma is proved. 
We call a monad F binary if CF(X, ξ) is binary for each F-algebra (X, ξ).
Lemma 3. Let F = (F, η, µ) be a binary L-monad which weakly preserves preim-
ages. Then for each F-algebra (X, ξ) the convexity CF(X, ξ) is T2.
Proof. Consider any two distinct points x, y ∈ X . Since ξ is a morphism of F-
algebras (FX, µX) and (X, ξ), it is a CP-map and we have ξ−1(x), ξ−1(y) ∈
CF(FX, µ). Since CF(FX, µ) is T2 and binary, it is normal by Lemma 1. Hence
we can choose L1, L2 ∈ CF(FX, µ) such that L1 ∪ L2 = FX and L1 ∩ ξ−1(x) = ∅,
L2∩ξ−1(y) = ∅. Then we have ξ(L1), ξ(L2) ∈ CF(X, ξ) by Lemma 2, ξ(L1)∪ξ(L2) =
X , x /∈ L1 and y /∈ L2. The lemma is proved. 
Consider any L-monad F = (F, η, µ). It is easy to check that for each segment
[a, b] ⊂ R the pair ([a, b], ξ[a,b]) is an F -algebra where ξ[a,b] = piid[a,b] . Consider
a game f : X =
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n where for each compactum Xi there exists a
map ξi : FXi → Xi such that the pair (Xi, ξi) is an F-algebra. We say that
the function fi : X → R is an F-algebras morphism by i-th coordinate if for
each x ∈ X the function fxi : Xi → R is a morphism of F-algebras (Xi, ξi) and
([min fxi ,max f
x
i ], ξ[min fxi ,max fxi ]).
Theorem 4. Let F = (F, η, µ) be a binary L-monad which weakly preserves preim-
ages. Let f : X =
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n be a game such that there is defined an F-algebra
map ξi : FXi → Xi on each continuum Xi, the function f is continuous and
the function fi : X → R is an F-algebras morphism by i-th coordinate for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium point.
Proof. Since for each x ∈ X the function fxi : Xi → R is an F-algebras morphism,
it is a CP-map, hence quasi concave. Now, our theorem follows from Lemma 3 and
Corollary 1. 
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5. Pure and mixed strategies
Let F = (F, η, µ) be a binary L-monad which weakly preserves preimages. We
consider Nash equilibrium for free algebras (FX, µX) in this section. Points of a
compactum X we call pure strategies and points of FX we call mixed strategies.
Such approach is a natural generalization of the model from [8] where spaces of
capacities MX were considered.
We consider a game u : X =
∏n
i=1Xi → R
n with compact Hausdorff spaces of
pure strategies X1, . . . , Xn and continuous payoff functions ui :
∏n
i=1Xi → R.
It is well known how to construct the tensor product of two (or finite number)
probability measures. This operation was generalized in [20] for each monad in the
category Comp. More precisely there was constructed for each compactaX1, . . . , Xn
a continuous map ⊗ :
∏n
i=1 FXi → F (
∏n
i=1Xi) which is natural by each argument
and for each i we have F (pi) ◦ ⊗ = pri where pi :
∏n
j=1Xj → Xi and pri :∏n
j=1 FXj → FXi are natural projections.
We define the payoff functions eui : FX1×· · ·×FXn → R by the formula eui =
piui ◦⊗. Evidently, eui is continuous. Consider any t ∈ R and ν ∈ FX1×· · ·×FXn.
Then we have (euνi )
−1[t; +∞) = {µi ∈ FXi | eui(ν;µi) ≥ ti} = l−1(pi−1ui [t; +∞) ∩
{νi}×· · ·×FXi×· · ·×{νn}), where l : FXi →
∏n
j=1 FXj is an embedding defined
by l(µi) = (ν;µi) for µi ∈ FXi. A structure of F-algebra on the product
∏n
j=1 FXj
of F-algebras (FXi, µXi) is given by a map ξ : F (
∏n
i=1 FXi)→
∏n
i=1 FXi defined
by the formula ξ = (µXi ◦F (pi))
n
i=1. It is easy to check that a product of convex in
FXi sets is convex in
∏n
i=1 FXi. Since F weakly preserves preimages, pi
−1
ui
[t; +∞)
is convex in
∏n
i=1 FXi. It is easy to see that l is a CP-map, hence the map eui is
quasiconcave on i-th coordinate.
Hence, using Corollary 1, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The game with payoff functions eui has a Nash equilibrium point
provided each FXi is connected.
Now, consider a game in capacities with Sugeno payoff functions introduced in
the beginning of the paper.
The assignment M extends to the capacity functor M in the category of com-
pacta, if the map Mf :MX →MY for a continuous map of compacta f : X → Y
is defined by the formula Mf(c)(F ) = c(f−1(F )) where c ∈MX and F is a closed
subset of X . This functor was completed to the monad M = (M, η, µ) [12], where
the components of the natural transformations are defined as follows: ηX(x)(F ) = 1
if x ∈ F and ηX(x)(F ) = 0 if x /∈ F ; µX(C)(F ) = sup{t ∈ [0, 1] | C({c ∈ MX |
c(F ) ≥ t}) ≥ t}, where x ∈ X , F is a closed subset of X and C ∈ M2(X). Since
capacity monad M is a binary L-monad which weakly preserves preimages with
piϕ(ν) =
∫ Sug
X
fdν for any ν ∈MX and ϕ ∈ C(X) [14], we obtain as a consequence
Corollary 2. A game in capacities sf :
∏n
i=1MXi → R
n with Sugeno payoff
functions has a Nash equilibrium point.
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